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La Città Felice appears at the beginning of one of Francesco Patrizi
da Cherso’s earliest published volumes. This short utopian exposition
has received a good deal of attention, mainly in Italian scholarship;
however, the full text has been rendered somewhat inaccessible by
the lack of a reliable modern edition. Facsimiles of the original work
are limited and present difficulties for those lacking experience in
reading sixteenth century Italian. This article aims to make more
accessible this interesting and very early work of Patrizi, using a
minimally modernised transcription taken directly from the 1553
original edition: I will introduce the basic premises of the work, its
classical influences and its place against the background of the
sixteenth century utopian genre.1
La Città Felice (The Happy City: hereafter, LCF) was published by
Giovanni Griffio in Venice 1553 and a copy of this original edition is
held in the collection of the British Library. This small volume
contains three other works in addition to La Città Felice: I l
Barignano: Dialogo dell’Honore, Il Barignano; Discorso, della
diversità de’ furori poetici; Lettura Sopra il Sonetto del Petrarca. All
of these works except the Discorso are preceded by dedicatory letters.
LCF itself is introduced by an address to Urbano Vigerio of Rovere.2
These are very early works, published during Patrizi’s final years as a
student at the University of Padua, where he undertook seven years of
                                                           
1 I am indebted to Dr Guido Giglioni of the Warburg Institute, University of London,
whose guidance, contributions and corrections were essential to the finished project.
2 All references will be to the transcription of Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, La Città
Felice, the first edition of which was published by Giovanni Griffio in Venice in
1553: British Library 231a28.
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study commencing in 1547, initially studying medicine and later
philosophy.3
It is interesting that Patrizi, who was to become a highly significant
critic of the prevailing Aristotelianism of his time, began his
education with the faculty at Padua. A heavily Aristotelian
curriculum was standard during this period, but this faculty was
recognised as a particular stronghold of Aristotelian teaching and
study.4 LCF explicitly displays the influence of Aristotle’s Politics
and Nicomachean Ethics, as well as the influence of Plato’s Republic.
It is worth noting from the outset that, under these influences, the
natural law of Patrizi’s utopian city produces an explicitly segregated
and inequitable society when it comes to the bestowing of happiness
and contentment. Also interesting is the clear influence of Patrizi’s
sixteenth century medical training upon the work, as evidence both of
his personal knowledge and of the trends of medical thinking of his
time.
Though it is certainly a utopian work, LCF is sometimes considered
problematic: being a concise text addressed directly to the reader, it
seems at first glance to be out of place in the genre of Thomas More’s
Utopia and Tommaso Campanella’s La Città del Sole.5 The text is
neither narrative nor dialectic, but is presented as a straightforward
exposition of an ideal society. As is true of any utopian proposal, the
intention and motivation of the work is open to interpretation, but it
seems reasonable to approach this work as an exercise in philosophy
                                                           
3 For a highly accessible introduction to Patrizi’s life and works, including a
comprehensive bibliography, see Fred Purnell, ‘Francesco Patrizi da Cherso’,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/patrizi/.
4 For further discussion, see G Saitta, ‘Platonismo e antiaristotelismo di Francesco
Patrizi da Cherso’ in Il pensiero italiano nell’umanesimo e nel Rinascimento II,
(Florence, 1966) 533-578.
5 For notes to more detailed comparisons and a concise discussion of the problems of
defining the genre of utopia in the period, see Lawrence E Hough, ‘La Città Felice:
A Renaissance Utopia’ in Patrizia Castelli (ed) Francesco Patrizi: filosofo platonico
nel crepuscolo del Rinascimento (Florence, 2002) 31-34.
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rather than a true proposal, or a parody of a proposal, for social
organisation.6
Given the key role of happiness in any utopian vision, this discussion
must be guided by Patrizi’s treatment of individual happiness within a
social structure geared towards the well-being of the whole. Four
basic issues need to be addressed: how is the necessity of happiness
determined, how is happiness defined, how is happiness (potentially
and actually) achieved, and by whom? The reasoning behind the
necessity, nature, conditions and recipients of individual happiness
must be seen in relation to the sense of communal and individual
morality of the imagined society.
La Città Felice
The work opens with an outline of Patrizi’s definition of the nature of
man, the necessities of his life and, most particularly, the necessity of
societal living. Patrizi’s definition of man is distinctly Aristotelian:7
man is twofold, containing body and soul,8 and the soul itself is
twofold, containing a subjective, irrational part and a higher rational
part.9 These definitions determine the structure of Patrizi’s definition
of the conditions for a happy life. The necessity and nature of human
happiness is simply described as the greatest good achievable by
man: ‘therefore this last, and highest, good in which men repose is the
happiness proper to man, such that it is not possible to acquire any
greater good in this world’.10 This statement is conditional in that it
refers to ‘appropriate’ happiness. The method of Patrizi’s work
becomes evident in the list of conditions necessary for happiness. He
prescribes that if a man wishes to achieve this state appropriate to
humans, he must achieve it in seven items: these begin with the soul
                                                           
6 Ibid, 37.
7 Aristotle, Politics, I, v, 5-8. For further discussion on this point, see Cesare Vasoli,
Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (Rome, 1989) 6-7.
8 Patrizi, La Città Felice (hereafter: LCF) f 4r.
9 LCF, f 15v–16r.
10 ‘Questo ultimo, adunque, e sommo bene, nel quale egli si riposa, è la propria
felicità dell’uomo, della quale maggior bene alcuno egli non si può in questo mondo
acquistare’, LCF, f 5r.
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itself; the soul as it cares for and governs the body; likewise the body
itself, in the provision and means of its maintenance; and, lastly, in
the union of body and soul.11
This notion of happiness as the fully realised material and spiritual
potential of man’s body and soul follows from the Aristotelian
definition above.12 Indeed, Patrizi attributes these seven items to
Aristotle, saying that these conditions themselves rest on three main
conditions: longevity, comfort and virtue.13 Unsurprisingly,
precedence is given to virtue: ‘Happiness, therefore, consists for its
greater part and its fulfilment in the activities of virtue, so if our
citizens want to be happy, they need to first be virtuous’.14 The idea
that virtue is the origin of true happiness is also a feature of
Aristotle,15 but its heritage can be traced to Plato’s Republic.16 It is a
fundamental feature of sixteenth century utopian writing: Thomas
More’s Utopians, to take the obvious example, see happiness as the
divinely ordained state of mankind and believe that happiness can
only truly reside in virtue. They believe man has an innate ability to
assess the virtue of an activity on the basis of the pleasure he gains
from it. The influence of the Stoic doctrine upon More is clearly
recognisable.17
Following these summary statements on happiness, Patrizi discusses
the care of the body, evidencing his sixteenth century medical
                                                           
11 ‘E primieramente nell’anima semplicemente sola; secondo nell’anima, per quanto
ella il corpo governa; appresso nella medesima, per la cura, che ella ha delle cose,
che estrinsecamente al corpo fanno mestieri; quarto, nel corpo per se stesso; quinto,
nelle cose che al mantenimento di lui sono necessarie; sesto, in quegli istrumenti, che
tali cose gli apparecchiano; ultimo, nel tempo del congiungimento dell’anima col
corpo’, LCF, f 5r.
12 Vasoli, op cit, 6-7.
13 LCF, f 5r. See also: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I vii 13-16.
14 ‘Consistendo, adunque, la felicità, per la miglior parte e compimento suo,
nell’operazioni della virtù, bisogna, se i nostri cittadini vogliono esser beati, che
sieno in prima virtuosi’, LCF, f 14v.
15 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, viii, 4-9.
16 Plato, Republic, II 354a.




background in his discussion of the dual spirits which link the body to
the soul and are generated by elements of the blood and inhaled air.18
He states at the end, however, that he will include only ‘healthy
bodies of good natural disposition’ in his ideal city.19 How this is to
be achieved is partially explained by Patrizi’s ideas on procreation
and also by the careful placement and design of the city. Detailed
concern for the location of the ideal society, in terms both of general
geographic location and of the specific site of the main city, are
commonplace in sixteenth century utopian writing.20 The three main
criteria, all included in LCF, are the ability of the society to be as
self-sufficient as possible in terms of agriculture and raw materials;
the ease of defence against attack and particularly, the ability to
withstand siege; and the ability to deal with issues of health, namely
the avoidance of extremes of climate and, particularly, humidity and
dampness.21 The whole discussion of these issues of public and
private health shows a strong connection to the Politics.22
These points cover comfort and longevity of the body, which are
prerequisite to achieving true virtue and happiness. It is the achieving
of virtue, however, that segregates Patrizi’s happy city. The first two
conditions, longevity and comfort, are described as those things ‘that
maintain our life for a long time, and those which enable us to lead
life in comfort and without any impediment’.23 Long life is necessary
because a complete life, including the whole cycle of human
experience from infancy to old age, is necessary to pursue virtue:
another Aristotelian idea.24 Freedom from commitments and material
impediments is also essential.25
                                                           
18 LCF, f 6r-6v.
19 ‘… perciocché io toglio nella mia città i corpi sani, e naturalemente ben disposti
..’., LCF, f 6v.
20 Similar discussions occur in More, op cit, and Tomasso Campanella, La Città del
Sole, ed Luigi Firpo, Germana Ernst and Laura Salvetti Firpo (Bari, 1997).
21 LCF, f 7v-9r.
22 Aristotle, Politics, VII, x, 1-8.
23 ‘Cioè delle cose, con le quali la vita nostra lungamente si mantiene; e di quelle che
in agio, e senza impedimento veruno, la ci fanno menare’, LCF, f 14v.
24 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, vii, 15-16.
25 LCF, f 5r.
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The necessity of community is also partially explained in terms of
providing for these two necessities. Since these provisions cannot all
be made by the individual for himself, his needs drive him naturally
towards fellowship, community and affection for other humans.26
This explanation for the origin of society is, again, distinctly
Aristotelian.27 Patrizi quotes directly from Aristotle,28 showing the
depth of this perceived natural tendency toward community and
saying that the man who does not feel such inclination is either a
beast or a God.29
However, when it comes to the actual composition of the community,
Patrizi defends the hierarchical ideal of society presented by Plato
and Aristotle, in contrast to the more egalitarian visions of More and
Campanella. Patrizi states that six types of men are required for the
constitution of a happy city: rural workers, artisans, merchants,
warriors, magistrati or guardians, and priests.30 This hierarchy is
presided over by a theocratic head of state referred to as the
legislatore. The functions of each of these classes is defined with
precision: the rural workers provide food and raw materials; the
artisans build the greater and smaller things necessary to the life of
the city, prepare and cook food; the merchants sell what is produced
in the city and make trade with other cities for items not produced.31
These three classes, however, exist only to aid the other three in
achieving the comfort and longevity, and hence the ‘contemplative
and active virtues’, that comprise happiness. The division is posed in
an illustrative form: ‘These six kinds of men … will they all drink of
the celestial waters? Certainly all those, to whom the definition of
                                                           
26 LCF, f 4r.
27 Vasoli, op cit, 5.
28 Aristotle, Politics, I, I, 12.
29 ‘ ... di tal modo, che chiunque non ama di essere e conversare insieme con altri
uomini, o da più, che uomo è necessario che sia, o da meno; e come per antico
proverbio si disse, che egli sia o Dio, o bestia’, LCF, f 4v.
30 LCF, f 13r.
31 LCF, f 13r-13v.
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happiness applies, will be satiated by those waters and be happy’.32
But the threefold definition of happiness does not apply to the rural
workers, artisans or merchants who, due the impediments of their
lives of hard labour, stress and instability, do not have the time or
leisure to acquire the virtues necessary to happiness,33 ‘from which
these three kinds of men are rightly deprived and exiled’.34 The
deprivation of happiness is explicitly drawn.
Patrizi’s justification for this inequity is that these lower orders, the
‘enslaved and miserable’ caste, are born slaves.35 They are a type of
human that is ‘timid and of lesser soul, easily commanded and truly
servants by their nature’. Patrizi’s description of their status in society
bears the direct influence both of Plato’s Republic36 and of Aristotle’s
Politics.37 They provide necessities but are as tools to the important
business of the citizenry, and the rules of community that are applied
to the upper castes do not apply to them. The upper castes recognise
their kinship and dine together to promote stability and concord,38 but
the lower castes are to be kept from living in family groups so that
they may not conspire to rebel.39 The idea of promotion of
community through common meals is a common feature of utopian
writing, and Patrizi refers to the practice as a tradition of the kings of
Italy, citing Aristotle.40 However, it may be noted that there are no
born  slaves in either Utopia or La Città del Sole. Slavery is a
                                                           
32 ‘Queste sei predette maniere d’uomini … beeranno elleno tutte dell’acque
sopracelesti? Certo tutte quelle saranno dell’acque saziate e felici, a cui converra la
diffinizione della felicità’, LCF, f 13v.
33 LCF, f 13v.
34 ‘…delle quali, queste tre ragioni d’uomini sono digiuni ed isbanditi’, LCF, f 14r.
35 ‘Et in somma dirò la nostra città avere due parti, l’una servile e misera, l’altra
signora e beata’.
36 Plato, Republic, IV, 416c-417b.
37 ‘Et acciocché, comandando loro i signori, non ardiscano di opporsi a i
comandamenti loro, sieno timidi, e di vile animo; e, come si dice, servi per propria
natura’, LCF, f 7r. Note the influence of the Aristotelian idea of natural born slaves,
for whom slavery is expedient and just: Aristotle, Politics, I, ii, 15-16.
38 LCF, f 9v.
39 LCF, f 7r.
40 Aristotle, Politics, VII, ix, 3-5.
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punishment in Utopia and, in Campanella’s society, no labour is
lower than any other.41
The remaining three orders in LCF – warriors, governors and priests
– comprise the citizenry and the community of the happy. They can
‘devote their entire souls to both civil and contemplative virtue’, their
needs having been furnished by the non-citizen orders.42 This idea of
the crafting of virtue recalls Plato’s Republic, where the guardians,
having been released from all other crafts, are to be ‘expert craftsmen
of civil liberty, and pursue nothing else that does not conduce to
this’.43 Patrizi is equally precise about the attaining of virtue. The
potential for virtue is inbred,44 this potential being realised through
communal education,45 social conditioning and indoctrination: the
forming of ‘good habits’ designed to cleanse the soul of all
inappropriate appetites, affectations and impurities. Heavy censorship
of stimuli plays an important role in this process.46 The exposition on
virtue shows the influence of Book II of Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics, in that some kinds of virtue are regarded as most suited to
conscious learning and others considered best formed by
conditioning.47 The section on music refers directly to the Republic,
which expounds the potential for music to instil and develop a natural
sense of harmony into the minds of the young.
Medical principles, and especially those of medical astrology, are
utilised in the regulation of reproduction and birth. If a citizen’s
virtue is cultivated through education and condition, then his or her
potential for achieving perfection in that virtue is at least partially
‘inbred’ according to these principles. Patrizi’s principles of inbred
virtue are relatively moderate. Optimisation is achieved through good
timing of the procreative act, along with a programme of education
                                                           
41 Campanella, op cit, 23, 497-8, 33, 713-17; More, op cit, 184.
42 ‘Gli altri tre ordini … possono donare tutto l’animo alle virtù e civili e
contemplative’, LCF, f 14r.
43 Plato, Republic, III, 395b-395c.
44 LCF, f 16r.
45 LCF, f 18r.
46 LCF, f 17v.
47 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, I, 1-3.
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and indoctrination. The ages of the couples, and aspects of the
woman’s diet and activity during pregnancy, are also laid down.48
In contrast, in Utopia there is no practise of eugenics; good character
is instilled by educational and social constraints, which optimise an
innate ability to recognise right and wrong.49 Campanella, however,
proposes the extended family and eugenic regime reminiscent of that
of the guardians of Plato’s Republic,50 and applies it to his entire
society in an extreme and methodical way.51 People are paired off
according to their physique and temperament, and their mating is
timed to fortuitous astrological conjunctions.52 The whole foundation
of the Solarians’ happiness through social stability53 and lack of
negative traits lies in their eugenic programme.54
LCF does not employ mercenaries, since their motivation is fiscal
rather than patriotic.55 The patriotism, physical endurance and skill of
the soldier class are nurtured from birth, and they are also disciplined
and conditioned to be a highly unified body.56 While Patrizi prefers
not to rely on fiscal motivation alone, he does recognise its power and
decrees that the warrior class must maintain their families and half of
their possessions within the territory, with the other half close to the
city. This will ensure their full commitment to the protection of the
city during war since, as Patrizi points out, those who have nothing to
lose from defeat may lack commitment and those who have too much
to lose may attempt to protect their possessions by treacherous
arrangements with the enemy.57
                                                           
48 LCF, f 16r-17r.
49 More, op cit, 162-66.
50 Plato, Republic, V.
51 Campanella, op cit, 10, 148-54.
52 Ibid, 19, 394.
53 Ibid, 21, 418-21.
54 Ibid, 17, 334-35 and 22, 443-45.
55 LCF, f 11v.
56 LCF, f 11r -11v.
57 LCF, f 11r.
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The guaranteeing of army loyalty is understandably a fairly popular
theme across genres. Patrizi’s idea of the placement of property also
occurs in the Politics58 and, closer to Patrizi’s own time, Thomas
More proposed the Platonic idea of having whole families of
Utopians go into the field of battle together in order to guarantee the
fiercest possible defence.59 Campanella likewise had blood-relations
fighting together and, in The Prince, Machiavelli recommends the
placement of personal property as a motivating force in the same way
as Patrizi.60
At the top of LCF’s hierarchy are the priests, the magistrati and the
legislatore. The magistrati are described as those who guide the
multitudes towards the celestial waters, with the priests praying to
gain divine favour for the journey to that happy land on behalf of the
populace.61 The magistrati may be related to Plato’s guardians on
many points, but Patrizi’s account of them must be read in the context
of his background. Paola Maria Acari points out that they may bear
an equal relationship to the Venetian aristocracy as to Plato’s
idealised guardian class.62 Essentially, they are law-keepers, and it is
they who, in their maturity, govern and run the courts.63
The priests take on the duty of prayer on behalf of the whole
populace, and this intercessory role is another interesting aspect of
the place of personal, individual religion in LCF. The idea of a highly
communalised form of religion is common to this genre:
Campanella’s Solarians, for example, exercised a strong sense of
communal morality and accountability, undertaking communal
confession and absolution via the hierarchy of their priesthood, with
the head of state acting as the ultimate intercessor with the divine.64
                                                           
58 Aristotle, Politics, VII, ix, 6-8.
59 More, op cit, 210.
60 Campanella, op cit, 42, 945-9.
61 LCF, f 13v.
62 Paola Maria Acari, Il pensiero politico di Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (Rome,
1935) 77.
63 LCF, f 10v.
64 Campanella, op cit, 43, 975-85.
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Patrizi’s ideas are less extreme, but nonetheless the sense of
communalised, as opposed to personalised, religion remains.
The legislatore of LCF similarly takes on a dual role between secular
and spiritual duties. The polyvalence of the title ought be noted: he is
obviously a legislator, but the multiplicity of his functions, as chief
astrologer, priest, lawmaker and guardian of the rearing and moral
indoctrination of children, seem to overtake this nomination.65 Vasoli
refers to him as a sage-priest66 and others, such as Hough, refer to
him as a king-philosopher.67 Either way, the theocratic structure of
Patrizi’s society rests upon his role. Here, it is important to note the
work of Ficino, where one finds a theocratic leader of this kind,
working under the guidance both of astrology as a science and of a
divine will that safeguards the secular and spiritual life of a society.68
Campanella also took up this idea of a theocratic head of state,
although his City of the Sun is definitely a theocratic monarchy,69
whereas Patrizi’s city may be viewed as an oligarchy.70 Augustine’s
City of God is also cited by Hough as another precedent for the form
of theocratic rule practised by the priest-sages.71
The status of the legislatore is an important issue for LCF. The idea
that Patrizi’s utopia may have been at least partially modelled upon
the governance of mid-sixteenth century Venice has already been
mentioned. Acari argues for this model, citing details of the
hierarchic structure of Patrizi’s created society and relating them to
the class system and rule in Venice.72 Vasoli’s study nevertheless
points to the difficulty of quantifying a concrete connection between
                                                           
65 The responsibility for virtually every aspect of life described in LCF is ultimately
given to the legislatore, with his authority being cited for almost all sections.
66 Vasoli, op cit, 3.
67 Hough, op cit, 44.
68 For further discussion and full citation, see Vasoli, op cit, 18-19.
69 Campanella, op cit, 7, 79-83.
70 Curcio and Vasoli disagree on the extent of the theocracy of LCF: C Curcio,
Utopisti e riformati sociali del Cinquecento (Bologna, 1941) xvi; Vasoli, op cit, 17.
71 Hough, op cit, 40-41.
72 Acari, op cit, 77.
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the political reality of the governance of Venice and Patrizi’s
visionary state ruled by a class of sage-priests.73
Patrizi’s imagery and metaphor also display influences from both
classical and more recent sources, some quite explicit and others less
so. The steep mountain of virtue that the lower classes lack the
resources to climb is an extremely familiar image, most famously
used by Dante in his vision of the ascension of purgatory and
paradise. The concept of the ‘celestial waters’ as a holy experience
borne from the full realisation of human potential in body and soul
shows the influence of Mirandola’s imagery of the experience of the
word of god.74 Lastly, the idea of society as a body, with diseased
limbs that must be severed, recalls Aristotle’s analogy in the
Politics,75 along with a wealth of imagery of Christian society as
forming a single body.
Conclusion
In Patrizi’s LCF then, happiness is of necessity an aim for humans.
Patrizi sees it as the ideal state for mankind and, as in Plato, Aristotle,
More and Campanella, happiness is understood to reside primarily in
virtue. For Patrizi, moral virtue is achieved by habitually conditioning
the individual; intellectual virtue arises from the conscious effort of
education. Both require a certain inherited nature, and the comfort
that freedom from material distraction allows.
For this reason, Patrizi’s society is segregated on the basis of birth,
with the labour of an underclass providing the necessities for the
happiness of the citizenry. Thus the underclasses are part of the
fundamental structure which produces individual happiness, without
partaking in that happiness themselves. Private life and private
property remain fairly intact in Patrizi, but behaviour is regulated by
indoctrination and any serious trespass is punished severely, so as to
                                                           
73 Vasoli, op cit, 3.
74 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno e
scritti vari, ed E Garin (Florence, 1942) 210-12, 274-76.
75 Aristotle, Politics, I, I, 11-12.
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maintain the purity of the citizenry. Although Campanella’s Solarians
live a totally communal life without any concept of private property
or a nuclear family unit, they share with LCF  the concept of
community as a single body to be maintained. Thus they also deal
with serious offences severely, and one may cite similar analogies of
the removal of rotted or diseased limbs.
Certain elements of Patrizi’s work, such as the necessity of happiness,
the necessity of virtue and physical health as the basis for that
happiness, the isolation of the utopian community, and the use of
soldiers’ property and family bonds to ensure loyalty, are common to
the utopian genre of his period. Similar elements are found in More’s
Utopia and Campanella’s La Città del Sole. Their formulation is
nevertheless different in each work. Individual happiness provides a
shifting but useful lens for the examination of utopian fiction
because, in quantifying the necessity, definition, conditions and
recipient body of happiness, the focus changes according to the form
and method of the work in question. For example, in L C F, the
discussion of happiness ascertains the exact lifestyle requirements for
achieving virtue as the essential part of happiness and the precise
methods for acquiring different types of virtue. In Utopia, the same
discussion lingers rather on religion and the understanding of natural
law. In La Città del Sole, eugenics lies at the foundation of the
proposals for achieving the stability, harmony and loss of self-love
that lead to individual and to communal happiness. Other elements of
Patrizi’s work stand in contrast to some of these other famous
utopias, but are nonetheless not unprecedented. His use of the
Aristotelian divisions of society and idea of a born underclass may
seem dystopic, rather than utopic, to the modern reader. In the context
of his time, however, these were entirely justified on the basis of the
authority of classical sources and their assessment of the observable
expediency of a naturally appointed underclass to serve the greater
good.

